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AGENCY
ERNEST L. FOLK, III*
1. Liability of the Unauthorized Agent
It has long been firmly established in this State that an
unauthorized agent is liable on the contract itself rather than,
as in most jurisdictions, on the ground of breach of his ex-
press or implied warranty of authority1 or, less frequently,
on a theory of the agent's misrepresentation of his authority.
Indeed, in this State, contract liability is said to be the "ex-
clusive" remedy when the principal's liability fails for want
of the agent's authority.
2
This theory was recently invoked in Skinner & Ruddock,
Inc. v. London Guarantee & Ace. Co.,3 to hold an insurance
agent personally liable on an unauthorized insurance contract.
There a Charleston insurance agent, allegedly without au-
thority, added to a properly issued insurance policy a rider
covering loss incurred in wrecking certain buildings. When
the wall of an adjoining building collapsed and damaged
adjacent property, the insurer denied any liability under the
rider, arguing that it was unauthorized. The complaint, as-
serting a cause of action against the allegedly unauthorized
agent was sustained against demurrer and this ruling as to
the presence of a cause of action was upheld on appeal. In-
itially recognizing the agent's indisputable immunity on an
authorized contract including an authorized insurance policy,
the Court observed that:
[W]here an agent makes a contract in the name of his
principal without authority and the principal is not liable,
the agent may be held liable on such contract .... There-
fore, if the [agent] adjusted the loss of the [claimant]
under the policy endorsement in question without author-
ity to do so, it may be held liable on the contract.4
Although Skinner & Ruddock presents no new issue, it's ap-
pearance makes timely a review of the South Carolina
decisions under a rule which today seems chiefly confined to
*Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. RESTATEMENT AGENCY (SECOND), § 329 (1958).2. Id. § 330.3. 239 S. C. 614, 124 S. E. 2d. 178 (1962).
4. Id. at 619, 124 S. E. 2d at 180.
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this State. The earliest decision is Edings v. Brown which
held an unauthorized agent liable for breach of a warranty
of soundness contained in a bill of sale of a slave. Bank of
Hamburg v. Wray6 was the first of several decisions apply-
ing the contract liability theory to unauthorized notes or other
negotiable instruments, and has been followed in the better
known rulings in Medlin v. Ebenezer Meth. Church. and Coral
Gables, Inc. v. Palmetto Brick Co.,s 'respectively decided in
1925 and 1937. All three of these decisions could also rest
upon the universally accepted rule that, on a negotiable in-
strument, an agent signing 'without authority is personally
liable, although the South Carolina Court seems not to have
invoked this even as an alternative ground to support the
obviously correct resiilts in these cases. 9 Lagrone v. Timmer-
man °0 in 1896 applied the rule for the first time to insurance
contracts, holding personally liable the agent of an insurer
found to have no legal existence." Although ignoring or un-
aware of Lagrone, the case most closely in point, Skinner &
Ruddock readily fits into this line of decisions, in holding per-
sonally liable an agent of a legally existing insurer where the
agent exceeded his authority in making the particular in-
surance contract.
In laying down the rule -and its justification Edings v.
Brown 12 relied heavily upon the authority of Chancellor Kent
and Justice Story, and indeed, in the early days of the Re-
public, this doctrine was probably the prevailing American
view. Apart from the fact - which should never be under-
estimated - that automatic liability of the unauthorized
agent on the contract is simple and easy to apply, the Edings
case justified the rule on two distinct grounds.
5. 1 Rich. L. 255 (1845).
6. 4 Strob. 87 (1849).
7. 132 S. C. 498, 129 S. E. 830 (1925).
8. 183 S. C. 478, 191 S. E. 337 (1937).
9. There, in Coral Gables, the note was a negotiable one ("I promise
to pay to the order of Coral Gables Corporation," the stated sum, 183
S. C. at 480), and under Section 20 of the Negotiable Instrument Law,
the decisions uniformly hold that the unauthorized agent is personally
liable on the instrument he purports to sign for another. See, e.g., New
Georgia Nat'l Bank v. J. & G. Lippman, 249 N.Y. 307, 164 N.E. 108
(1928). ("As the price, so to speak, of relief from liability when authority
exists, there is to be liability on the instrument when authority fails,"
(emphasis supplied). )
10. 46 S. C. 372, 24 S. E. 290 (1896).
11. See, for a statement of the rule, Ivey v. Vaughn, 93 S. C. 203, 76
S. E. 464 (1912).
12. 1 Rich. L. 255 (1845).
2
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The first was that "the undertaking to bind another, with-
out authority to do so, imports fraud or culpable negligence"
for which "the guilty person," the agent, should be respon-
sible.18 This approach was further developed in Rank of
Hamburg v. Wray14 where, indeed, the Court believed that the
facts justified finding that "the agent [had] no authority,
and [knew] it,"'' 5 since "it cannot be credited that [the agent]
was ignorant that the authority confided to him to use [his
principal's] name, was given only for [the latter's] benefit
in the course of his business; and not for the convenience of
[the agent's] friends, or for his own."'' 0 But even if such guilty
knowledge is lacking, the agent is nonetheless liable on the
same principles, for:
It is a wrong, differing only in degree, and not in its
essence, to state as true, what the individual, making
such statement, does not know to be true; even though
he does not know it to be false; and if that wrong pro-
duces injury to a third person, who is ignorant of the
grounds on which the belief of the supposed agent is
founded and who has relied on the correctness of his
assertions, it is equally just that he who makes such as-
sertion should be personally liable for the consequences. 17
Hence, by the time the Court decided Lagrone v. Timmer-
,an,' 8 it could flatly declare that [f]alsehood and deceit are
not necessary to charge an agent personally with a contract
he had no authority to make," for, indeed, in this case "the
Court takes pleasure in saying that the evidence does not
justify any imputation of moral fraud or intentional wrong
on the part of the" agent.' 9 In the later decisions, all reference
to this original justification of the agent's personal liability
drops out altogether. Indeed, the argument from fraud and
deceit is immaterial, since the question is whether there
should be some liability on the agent's part for a lack of
authority, even though his action is bona fide. This develop-
ment also parallels the warranty theory in other jurisdictions,
where it has been held applicable also to agents acting rea-
sonably and in good faith on their supposition of authority.
13. Id. at 258.
14. 4 Strob. 87 (1849).
15. Id. at 91.
16. Id. at 90-91
17. Id. at 91.
18. 46 S. C. 372, 24 S. E. 290 (1896).
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Similarly, those few jurisdictions which expressly rely on a
fraud concept to hold the agent liable have so watered down
the ingredients of fraud as to make the results of cases under
that theory virtually indistinguishable from those under the
contract liability or breach of warranty theories.
2 0
The second ground asserted in Edings v. Brown is that the
agent's contract liability is no more or less than a just method
for making whole the third party whose reasonable expecta-
tions have been defeated because of the principal's immunity
on the unauthorized contract.21 The agent's substituted li-
ability is said to be "only a fair and reasonable indemnity"
for the failure to bind the principal.22
Two objections are often offered to the agent's direct con-
tract liability. Thus, it is said that it is illogical to hold the
agent liable on a promise he never intended to make,23 an
objection which was considered but rejected in Edings. It
is true that probably the agent and the third party intended
to leave the agent without liability, but this was on the as-
sumption of the third party (and possibly of the agent) that
the principal would be bound on a contract which either or
both believed authorized. This does not necessarily rest on
archaic ideas of subjective intent of contracting parties, but
on the (probably) manifested understanding and assent to the
terms of the contract. Certainly, it would make no difference
on the theory of the South Carolina rule that the agent in
good faith believed in his own authority; that is to say, the
agent's liability would not be excused on the ground of good
faith, or imposed only in the event of wilful or malicious repre-
sentations of authority. Since the agent and third party
presumably contract on the assumption of the principal's
liability, it follows that, when that liability fails, the underly-
ing assumption on which the contest was made is inapplicable.
Because of this new situation, then, it is necessary to balance
(1) the expectation, at the time of the contract, that he
could contract without personal liability, and (2) the third
party's expectation that he would have performance or a
20. See MEcHEM, AGENCY § 324 (4th ed. 1952).
21. 1 Rich. L. 255 at 258. "It is only just that one who pretends to give
a security to another, by assuming to contract in the name of a person
whom he has no authority to bind, should supply, out of his own means,
the securtiy which he fails to impose on his (punative) principal." Id. at
257-58.
22. Id. at 258.
23. MEcHE1r, AGENCY OUTLINES § 323 (4th ed. 1952).
1962]
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remedy on the contract against the principal. Since (at
least in the case of the innocent agent) someone's expectations
will inevitably be thwarted, the question is whether it should
be the agent who presumably knew his principal's intentions
and who in any event had the superior facilities and oppor-
tunity to ascertain whether it should be the third party who,
absent some remedy against the agent, loses the bargained-
for benefit. The only question then is the form which the
remedy should take. 24 And this discussion so far indicates
that the objection is baseless that the parties did not "intend"
the agent to be liable on the contract. Indeed, at least in the
case of the honest agent, it was probably intended that he
should not be liable at all on any theory, although, as already
noted, liability accrues in some form or other since his liabi-
lity on an implied warranty of authority is absolute and not
based on fault.
A second objection offered to the agent's contract liability
is that it makes the third party better off than he would have
been if the agent had authority and the principal were
bound.25 This objection only applies if there is no suitable
limitation upon the third party's right of recovery. The
usual example is the unfairness of holding a solvent agent
fully liable on a contract purportedly binding an insolvent
principal who would have been unable to perform or respond
in damages had the contract been authorized and thus binding
upon him. Similary, if the agent's contract liability is not
appropriately limited (as it is in the cases applying the
warrant of authority theory), an agent can be held fully
liable on an oral executory contract within the Statute of
Frauds although the contract might not bind a principal be-
cause not in writing. A similar point could be made as to
unauthorized contracts which, even if authorized, could not
be performed by the principal because of supervening im-
possibility or illegality.26 Illustrations such as these indicate
that on a contract liability theory, the third party may be
in a better position precisely because the agent acted with-
24. Thus, in Medlin v. Ebenezer Meth. Church, 132 S. C. 498, 506, 129
S. E. 830, 832 (1925), the court recognizes that in other jurisdictions un-
authorized agents are normally held liable on a theory of breach of
warranty of authority, but observes that "the divergence of opinion relates
simply to the form of the remedy, conceding that the agent is liable."
Hence, the court decides to adhere to its own line of decisions beginning
with Edings.
25. MECHEMi, AGENCY OUTLINES § 323 (4th ed. 1952).
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out authority than if he had acted within the ambit of his
powers.
This paradox can be resolved by confining the third party's
recovery from the unauthorized agent, even though sued
on the contract itself, to damages "not only for the harm
caused to [the third party] by the fact that the agent was
unauthorized, but also for the amount by which [the third
party] would have been benefited had the authority existed.1
27
Thus, if the principal is insolvent, it is hardly justice to allow
the third party to recover in full from the unauthorized agent
when, if authority had existed, there could have been no
recovery against the principal; otherwise, -the third party
obtains a wholly unjustified windfall. 28 Similarly, if the
principal could not be held liable on an oral contract With-
in the Statute of Frauds, neither should the agent be held.
In short, the Court, when and if presented with this cru-
cial issue of damages under the contract theory, should not
give the third party greater damages against the unauthorized
agent than could be obtained against the principal had the
agent been authorized. Indeed, there are persuasive reasons
for not doing so. In effect, such a rule would place a premium
upon the agent's lack of authority. This in turn would be
a disincentive to the third party diligently to ascertain the
authority of the agent to the extent that he is able to do so.
And finally, awarding damages against an unauthorized agent
not obtainable against a principal if authority had existed is,
in substance, a punitive measure against the agent for his
lack of authority; and although all agree that he should
compensate the third party, no one argues that punitive
measures are in order, at least in the absence of fraud and
deceit by the unauthorized agent in deliberately misstating
his authority.
Thus, even though adhering to the direct contract liability
of the unauthorized agent, the Court should measure the
damages by the injury to the third party from the lack of
authority or the benefit which the third party has lost. That
is to say, the test should be the same as under the breach of
warranty theory. Of course, it can be objected that if this
is the measure of damages, the agent is not truly being held
liable on the contract. Even if this is true, the seeming
27. Ibid.
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inconsistency of measuring damages for breach of contract
by the loss to the third party from the agent's lack of author-
ity is less objectionable than the award of full damages from
the agent when no or minimal damages could be secured from
the principal. For if the agent's substituted liability on the
contract is in the nature of a security to the third party,
as Edings said it was, 20 the security should not exceed the
value of the contract to the third party if the agent had
bound his principal. No South Carolina decision has had
to resolve this problem, and it is uncertain how the Court
would handle it. The Edings case observes that:
If the contract be for the payment of money, in either
form of action [that is, either tort or contract] the dam-
ages must be for the sum stipulated; and if the contract
be for the performance of any other act, compensation
for the breach or neglect of the duty may as fairly be
decided in the one form as the other.30
This ambiguous language should not be taken as conclu-
sively favoring a rule which would give third party greater
damages from the unauthorized agent than he could obtain
had the agent been able to bind the principal.
2. Ratification
Insurance issues gave rise to a significant decision on
ratification in Fuller v. Eastern Fire & Cas. Co.,31 holding
sufficient evidence of ratification to sustain a jury verdict
against an insurance company. Asserting that the insurance
contract was not binding on it, the insurer had refused to
honor a claim arising from an automobile accident, or defend
a suit against the insured, with the result that the insured
personally paid a judgment against him. Thereafter, the in-
sured sued the company for breach of contract, and his re-
covery was sustained, on the ground that the insurer had
ratified the allegedly unauthorized policy.
Several decisions prior to Fuller held an insurance company
liable for an agent's unauthorized oral binder.3 2 In Fuller, the
29. Edings v. Brown, 1 Rich. L. 255, 258 (S. C. 1845).
30. Ibid.
31. 240 S. C. 75, 124 S. E. 2d 602 (1962).
32. Carolina Aviation Inc. v. Glenn Falls Ins. Co., 214 S. C. 222, 51 S. E.
2d 757 (1949); Simons v. American Fire Underwriters, 203 S. C. 471, 27
S. E. 2d 809 (1943); Dubuque Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Miller, 219 S. C.
17, 64 S. E. 2d 8 (1951). Cf. Fulmer v. London, Liverpool & Globe Fire
Ins. Co., 172 S. C. 525, 174 S. E. 466 (1934). See also Aiken Pet. Co. v.
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agent who gave a binder was not even technically an agent of
the company at the time since his license had already expired,
although clearly he intended to act as an agent and not as
his own principal. Ratification was given its usual relation-
back effect and thus validated the oral binder given by the
agent. Specifically, the facts showed that on May 1, the
agent gave the insured a binder and collected part of the
premium. The following day, the insured had an accident and
promptly notified the agent. It was not until May 4 that
the agent sent to the company the premium together with
the application which recited a May 1 date for the beginning
of coverage. Thereafter, the insurer issued a policy, with
an effective date of May 5 (the date the application was re-
ceived and approved), rather than May 1. The agent did not
inform the company of the accident until May 8, although,
of course, he knew of it on May 4 when he submitted the
application.
The Court's conclusion was that the jury had a sufficient
evidentary basis rationally to infer ratification of the insur-
ance contract. The crucial point, of course, was the company's
knowledge of the binder from the fact that the application
clearly stated a May 1 date. With this knowledge, the com-
pany's actions - accepting the premium, applying to the In-
surance Commissioner to reinstate the agent's expired license,
etc. - was a ratification of the binder. Thus, in effect, the
Court ruled that it is insufficient for an insurer to avoid
ratification by merely changing the effective date of the
policy, as was attempted here.
3. Master and Servant
The few cases in this category present no questions of
general interest, as they turn on the application of established
rules to their individual fact situations. Thus, Bates v.
Legette& turned back an attack upon a jury's resolution,
under proper instructions, of the independent contracter is-
sue in a case involving an automobile accident between plain-
tiff and a cab. The cab company ("Veterans") denied liabil-
ity on the ground that the particular cab was operated by an
independent contractor, since it was owned by an individual
and not by the corporation held liable and was licensed in
the individual's name. Other evidence showed that the cab
33. 239 S. C. 25, 121 S. E. 2d 289 (1961).
1962]
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carried Veterans' name, that 26 of the 34 Veterans' cabs were
owned by it, that the individual operated his cab under a
written arrangement with Veterans' that he was paid a
monthly wage by Veterans' and was subject to Veterans' rules
and discipline, including termination of the agreement at
Veterans' option, that at the time of the accident he was
transporting passengers picked up at a Veterans' cab stand,
and that his rates were "determined" by Veterans' and "two
other large taxi operators." 34 It is obvious, as the court found,
that such evidence amply supported a fact finding of master-
servant relationship. Indeed, not only did it satisfy the test
that Veterans' had "the right and authority to control and
direct the particular work or undertaking, as to the manner
or means of its accomplishment," but seemingly there was
even "actual control."35; In short the typical "independent"
but affiliated cab owner is a servant of the cab company.
The accepted doctrine that an employee assumes the "or-
dinary risks of his employment, of which he had knowledge"
and that the finding of assumed risk" "was fully warranted
by the evidence" was the basis in 7zaftchefl v. FielP8 for
sustaining on appeal a trial court's judgment for the employer
of a herdsman who had been severely kicked by one of his
employer's cows, especially since the herdsman was long ex--
perienced in his trade and was familiar with the cow who
administered the unfortunate kick.
34. Id. at 36, 121 S. E. 2d at 293-294.
35. Id. at 34-35, 121 S. E. 2d at 293.
6. 238 S. C. 398, 120 S. E. 2d 401 (1961).
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